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fault, the CCP calculates the termination amount 
on its side of the market. Given the back-to-back 
relationship Client has with Clearing Member, ec-
onomically speaking it takes the opposite side of 
the trade to the CCP. This means that the amount 
due to/payable by the Client will have been calcu-
lated on the other side of the market, even where 
Clearing Member is the defaulting party. The Cli-
ent always pays the spread on close-out. 
A word on collateral 
Collateral arrangements are addressed only in 
broad-brush terms in the Addendum, and this is an 
area on which all parties will wish to focus. Under 
the standard terms, if the documentary framework 
to which the Addendum is attached is an ISDA 
Master Agreement, any existing collateral terms 
will be disapplied and a basic clearing-compatible 
CSA (with terms pre-completed by ISDA to cor-
respond with the Addendum, a version of which is 
being released) will be deemed to apply. 
Parties will wish to consider whether these 
terms reflect their best negotiated position, and-
at a minimum-whether they reflect the practi-
calities of their collateral arrangements. As a con-
sequence of the above, it should be noted that the 
Addendum default terms mean that any collateral 
transferred will constitute a title transfer financial 
collateral arrangement-and there is a provision 
extending this effect to collateral arrangements 
under non-ISDA documents which would oth-
erwise not be captured by the deemed CSA de-
scribed above. 
CCP product offerings will also affect the col-
lateral arrangements between Clients, Clearing 
Members and CCPs, and the documentary and 
practical arrangements surrounding those prod-
ucts will need to be considered alongside the Ad-
dendum collateral provisions. 
Collectively, the above demonstrates the need 
for market participants to review and negotiate 
the Addendum with care. This is a complex and 
time-consuming process, and the volume of trad-
ing arrangements which need to be migrated to 
the cleared environment before the mandatory 
clearing deadline comes into effect under EMIR 
in 2014 means that the Addendum has not been 
published a moment too soon. 
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Ask The Professor: 
How Will The 
Seventh Circuit 
Rule in Sentinel II 
BY RONALD H. FILLER' 
On January 4, 2013, Judge James Zagel ruled 
that $14,479,000 that had been distributed to 
the Customer Segregated Account2 of FCStone 
in August 2007, must be returned back to the 
bankrupt estate of Sentinel Management Group 
("Sentinel").3 In August 2007, pursuant to a 
Court Order,4 funds had been distributed out 
of the bankrupt estate of Sentinel5 directly into 
Customer Segregated Accounts of several Futures 
Commission Merchants ("FCMs"), including the 
afore-mentioned Customer Segregated Account 
of FC Stone, the Defendant in this case.6 None of 
the funds were distributed directly to these FCMs. 
Sentinel was an unusual FCM in that it did not 
engage in futures trading activities on behalf of 
its customers.7 Sentinel was registered as a Fu-
tures Commission Merchant ("FCM") solely to 
receive customer assets held by other FCMs.8 
Sentinel, in essence, primarily provided an asset 
management investment service for two primary 
groups, namely (1) other FCMs which invested 
futures customer assets that they held in their re-
spective Customer Segregated Accounts into the 
Sentinel Customer Segregated Account which, in 
turn, invested such assets as permitted by Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") 
Rule 1.259 (hereinafter referred to as the "SEG 
1 Pool"), and (2) other private investors, includ-
ing hedge funds and even non-customer assets 
of FCMs (hereinafter referred to as the "SEG 3 
Pool").10 Accordingly, Sentinel was also registered 
as an investment adviser under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.11 
The following activities took placed during the 
period of August 13-21, 2007:12 
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1. Around August 13, 2007, Sentinel sent let-
ters to its customers stating that it had halt-
ed redemptions. 
2. Nevertheless, Sentinel did start to distribute 
certain assets to its FCM customers who in-
vested in the SEG 1 Pool. 
3. Sentinel filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code on August 17, 2007. 
4. On August 16, 2007, Sentinel started to 
sell a large amount of its portfolio to Cita-
del Trading ("Citadel"). These sales were 
eventually permitted by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court.13 
5. On August 20, 2007, Sentinel filed an emer-
gency order with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking 
an order approving the distribution of the 
proceeds of the securities sold to Citadel.14 
This Order was supported and approved by 
both the CFTC and the National Futures 
Association ("NFA"). 
6. On August 21, 2007, approximately $297 
million of the assets managed by Sentinel 
were distributed directly into the Customer 
Segregated Account of the 14 FCMs that 
had invested their futures customer assets 
into the SEG 1 Pool. Of this amount, ap-
proximately $14,479,000 was distributed 
directly into the Customer Segregated Ac-
count of FCStone. Only a small amount was 
distributed to customers who had invested 
their assets in the SEG 3 Pool. 
7. During the period of August 15-21, 2007, 
the amount distributed to the FCM Custom-
er Segregated Accounts that had invested in 
the SEG 1 Pool represented approximately 
32 % of the total of the assets under manage-
ment by Sentinel. If the distributions made 
to the FCM customer segregated accounts 
had been made on a pro rata basis, then ap-
plying this 32 % test, FCStone would only 
have received $6,977,653 (versus the larger 
amount that was transferred into its Cus-
tomer Segregate Account as noted above). 15 
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Frederick J. Grede was appointed as the 
Liquidation Trustee of the Sentinel estate on 
December 17, 2007, some four months after 
the proceeds of the Citadel sale were distrib-
uted to the Customer Segregated Accounts 
of the various FCMs that invested their cus-
tomer assets in the SEG 1 Pool.16 In Septem-
ber 2008, Mr. Grede brought this action to 
claw back the assets that were distributed to 
the SEG 1 Pool in August 2007 under the 
theory that the assets belonged pro rata to 
both the SEG 1 Pool and the SEG 3 Pool.17 
Judge Zagel agreed with the Trustee and held, 
in essence, as follows: 
1. The custody rule adopted by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursu-
ant to the IAA, namely SEC Rule 206(4)-2, 
created a statutory trust protection as ro-
bust as those set forth under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act ("CEA") and applicable 
CFTC regulations. Therefore, the SEG 3 
Pool customers have an equally forceful 
claim to trust protection as the SEG 1 Pool 
customers. 
2. FCStone, as the Defendant, is subject to 
common law tracing requirements due to 
the co-equal claims of the competing trust 
claimants. 
3. The assets distributed to the Customer Seg-
regated Accounts of the various FCMs back 
in August 2007 are property of the Senti-
nel bankrupt estate and were not "customer 
property" as defined by the CEA and appli-
cable CFTC regulations. 
4. The distribution made back in August 2007 
to the FCStone's Customer Segregated Ac-
counts was not authorized under the Bank-
ruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court. 
This paper will discuss each of these legal con-
clusions and analyze the economic impact of the 
Sentinel decision on the U.S. futures .markets. It 
will also examine the various briefs filed before 
the Seventh Circuit in this case and will thus 
attempt to determine how the Seventh Circuit 
might rule on the case on appeal. 
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THE FUTURES MARKETS 
IN GENERAL 
The U.S. futures markets play an important 
economic role by permitting commercial end us-
ers to hedge their inventory, production and con-
sumption activities through standardized futures 
contracts that consist of a variety of financial, ag-
ricultural, energy and other monetary end prod-
ucts. Historically, these futures contracts dealt 
primarily with traditional agricultural products, 
such as corn, wheat and soybeans, but, today, 
financial futures involving interest rates, stock 
indices and currency futures comprise more than 
80% of the daily volumes. A large asset manager 
can now easily hedge its investment market risks 
through a variety of financial products, including 
the S&P 500 Stock Index futures contract.18 If 
you're not a hedger,19 then you are deemed to be 
a speculator. 
Futures customers must open their futures ac-
count with a Futures Commission Merchant 
("FCM"). Unlike bank accounts that are pro-
tected by FDIC insurance and stock accounts that 
are protected by SIPC insurance (both insurance 
plans paid by the U.S. government),20 futures cus-
tomer accounts receive no such insurance pro-
tection. 21 Therefore, Congress in 1936 adopted 
Section 4d(a) of the CEA to protect futures cus-
tomers from any fraudulent or improper use of 
their assets by FCMs. 22 The CFTC, the federal 
regulatory agency which has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the U.S. futures markets and FCMs,23 
has issued various regulations that have provided 
further customer protections. In fact, until just 
recently with the failures of MF Global and Per-
egrine Financial Group, no FCM bankruptcy has 
resulted in any major shortfall to a Customer Seg-
regated Account of an FCM.24 Thus, the CEA for 
over 75 years and applicable CFTC regulations 
provided important customer protections to fu-
tures customers. The Sentinel II case could result 
in even a greater loss of customer confidence in 
the U.S. futures markets, just as the recent MF 
Global and Peregrine FCM bankruptcies have, if 
the 7th Circuit affirms Judge Zagel's decision. 
The IAA, enacted in 1940 following the Great 
Depression, does not have any such customer 
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asset protection erovisions as the CEA. Section 
206(4) of the IAA merely gives the SEC the right 
to adopt anti-fraud regulations to apply to invest-
ment advisers.25 In 1962, the SEC adopted SEC 
Rule 206(4)-2, which requires investment advis-
ers to hold customer assets with a bank, a broker-
dealer or an FCM.26 The IA Custody Rule, as it 
is commonly called, does not require many of the 
regulatory obligations and restrictions imposed 
on FCMs by the CFTC with respect to customer 
asset accounts, namely: 
1. Investment Advisers are not required to 
maintain any minimum net capital amounts, 
whereas FCMs must maintain very large 
amounts of regulatory capital;27 
2. Investment Advisers are not required to ob-
tain detailed "acknowledgement letters" 
from each custodian or depository that holds 
customer assets, as FCMs are required to;28 
3. Investment Advisers are not required to re-
port the amounts held in these custodial ac-
counts as FCMs are required to do;29 
4 . Investment Advisers are not required to in-
vest any of their own capital into their cus-
tomer custody account whereas all FCMs do 
so;30 and 
5. Investment Advisers are not subject to a large 
number of very specific rules relating to these 
custody accounts as FCMs are.31 
Judge Zagel's First Conclusion 
of law 
Sentinel II is a case of first impression regard-
ing the bankruptcy of a firm registered as both an 
FCM and as an IA. The issue before Judge Zagel 
in Sentinel II was whether the statutory trust cre-
ated by Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA was 
superior to the IA Custody Rule adopted by the 
SEC. Defendant FCStone made several arguments 
in support of this theory, namely: 
1. The customer protections provided by Con-
gress in Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the Com-
modity Exchange Act of 1936 were stronger 
than those resulting from a single SEC regu-
lation requiring funds to be held with a cus-
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todian. In fact, Congress has never enacted 
any such similar provision in the IAA. 
2. Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA em-
phatically states that the assets held in a 
Customer Segregated Account must be 
treated as customer property "belonging 
to" the customer regardless of their loca-
tion. In other words, the CEA created a 
"floating trust" over such customer prop-
erty32 whereas the IA Custody Rule merely 
requires that customer assets only be segre-
gated from the IA's own assets. Therefore, 
Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) made clear that 
the statutory trust imposed on customer 
segregated funds means that the assets in 
question, e.g., the SEG 1 Pool assets, could 
never be treated as the property of the de-
pository (e.g., Sentinel). Therefore, unless 
the SEG 1 Pool assets become property of 
the Sentinel estate, it could never be clawed 
back by the Trustee and redistributed to the 
SEG 3 Pool. Any such redistribution was 
statutorily prohibited. 
3. The legislative history accompanying Sec-
tions 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA clearly 
demonstrate that segregation violations and 
improper commingling of customer funds do 
not destroy the statutory trust created under 
the CEA.33 
4. Congress did not intend to protect IA advi-
sory client funds in the same manner as FCM 
customer funds because no provision under 
the IAA provides the specific customer pro-
tections that Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) do. 
5. The risks unique to the futures markets de-
mand that FCM customer-held property be 
afforded heightened protections compared to 
IA customer funds. 
6. The CFTC has promulgated a series of de-
tailed regulations regarding how customer 
assets must be held, reported and maintained 
whereas the IA Custody Rule merely requires 
that customer assets be held in one of three 
types of custodian firms. 34 
Judge Zagel did not accept any of these argu-
ments and held that the IA Custody Rule is also a 
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statutory trust, just like Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b), 
and that Congress did not intend to elevate pro-
tections for customer funds regulated by the CEA 
and CFTC regulations over customer funds reg-
ulated by the IA Custody Rule. He then stated: 
"there is no basis in law for elevating one federal 
statutory trust over another absent the tracing of 
specific property."35 Judge Zagel basically holds 
that when two trusts require segregation, without 
analyzing any other requirement, then the two 
trusts must be treated equally. He then stated: 
"Until Congress demonstrates a clear in-
tention to give commodity customers so-
called 'super priority' in bankruptcy, I have 
no basis for elevating the interests of the 
CEA over !AA-protected customers."36 
Query, will the Seventh Circuit accept Judge 
Zagel's analysis? I do not think so. While the IA 
Custody Rule does create a "regulatory" trust, 
the simple requirement of segregation under the 
IA Custody Rule should not elevate that regula-
tion to an equivalent statutory trust created by 
the CEA. If Congress wanted to create a statutory 
trust under the IAA, a law enacted four years af-
ter Section 4d(a) was added to the CEA, it could 
have done so. Instead, all Congress did was to 
give the SEC the authority to adopt a general 
anti-fraud rule. True, Congress knows that SEC 
Rule 206(4)-2 requires an investment adviser to 
place customer funds with a third party custo-
dian. However, one cannot elevate Congressional 
intent, as Judge Zagel seems to have done, to hold 
that a specific statutory trust regarding how fu-
tures customer funds are held to be treated the 
same as an SEC regulation regarding customer as-
sets held by a custodian selected by an investment 
adviser. Statutory construction simply should not 
work that way. One must look to the legislative 
history in analyzing the respective laws. And no-
where will you find any legislative history regard-
ing the use of a custodian by investment advisers. 
That is because no such law existed at the time of 
the Sentinel bankruptcy filing.37 If Congress want-
ed to treat both types of trusts as equal, as Judge 
Zagel has done, then the SEC should have sought 
such specific legislation regarding funds. managed 
by an IA. Moreover, Judge Zagel ignored all of the 
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specific regulations applicable to FCMs regarding 
how customer funds must be held in trust38 and 
that IAs, such as Sentinel, could have placed its 
customer assets with a broker-dealer or an FCM, 
and thus have received special asset protections.39 
In its Amicus Brief filed in Sentinel II in the 
Seventh Circuit, the CFTC argued that while the 
language of Section 4d (and related Section 4(d) 
(b)) does not actually use the word 'trust', "the 
rights and duties they create are precisely the sort 
that establish a trust both at common law and 
in other statutory concepts. The statutory scheme 
defines a res subject to the trust-the cash and 
property received by the FCM from its custom-
ers. "40 The CFTC then added: "And the statute 
and the implementing regulations impose a vari-
ety of restrictions on how the res can be treated 
by the FCM."41 The CFTC then states that "Sec-
tion 54 l(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that 
the property of the bankruptcy estate does not 
include property in which the debtor holds (e.g., 
Sentinel). "42 It only holds legal title but not equi-
table title.43 It goes on to state: 
"While section 6d relies on segregation 
as an important protection for commodity 
customer funds, its reach extends to cus-
tomer assets that an FCM or depository 
acting for an FCM has improperly failed 
to keep segregated" .... But the provision 
(e.g., Section 6d) also separately requires 
that the FCM "treat and deal with all mon-
ey, securities and property (received from 
a customer to serve as margin) ... as be-
longing to such customer." 44 
The CFTC in its Amicus Brief then stated, refer-
ring to the statement made by Judge Zagel that 
the assets held by Sentinel were subject to a statu-
tory trust arising out of SEC regulations, and thus 
gave Sentinel's securities customers an equally en-
forceable claim to the same trust protections as 
the SEG 1 Pool: 
"The CFTC believes that this holding, by 
treating commodity customer funds as 
property of the entity holding them (e.g., 
as assets of the bankrupt estate) rather 
than the property of customers, is funda-
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mentally inconsistent with 7 U.S.C. § 6d 
and, if upheld, could have consequences 
for the security of commodity customer 
funds going beyond the facts of this par-
ticular case. 
The district court's conclusion does not 
follow from its premises. The court's rea-
soning at most establishes a reason for 
some degree of parity treatment between 
commodity and securities customers. It 
does not justify treating customer funds as 
simply the property of the debtor, making 
them available for payment to creditors 
generally." 45 
The SEC in its Amicus Brief in Sentinel II in the 
Seventh Circuit obviously argued differently. It 
stated as follows: 
"In the SEC's views, contrary to FCStone's 
position, the custody rule provides adviso-
ry clients with segregated asset protection 
for client property that is as strong and as 
important as the segregated assets protec-
tion the CEA and related regulations pro-
vide to commodities customers." 46 
The SEC, like the CFTC, applied the ongoing 
trust principle by stating: 
"The import of (the custody rule) ... is that 
client funds never lose that character mere-
ly because an investment adviser ... takes 
possession of them." Citing Griffiths v. Peter-
son, 96 B.R. 314, 323 (Bankr. D. Colo 1988)"47 
The SEC went on to hold that there is no basis 
in law for elevating one federal statutory trust over 
another absent the tracing of specific property.48 
That argument thus raises the fundamental 
question before the Seventh Circuit. Do the spe-
cific customer segregation provisions set forth in 
the CEA and several CFTC regulations trump or 
not trump one SEC regulation. The relevant CEA 
section goes back to 1936 and was later amend-
ed in 1968 to extend the segregation obligation 
to custodians receiving segregated funds from 
FCMs. The applicable CFTC regulations have 
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also been around for decades. The applicable pro-
vision in the IAA merely gives the SEC the right 
to establish anti-fraud regulations for investment 
advisers. Using this statutory authority, the SEC 
adopted the IA Custody Rule. Query, are these 
two trusts equitable or competing?49 Should the 
commingling of the securities sold to Citadel have 
any impact on the rights of the futures custom-
ers regarding their assets held in the SEG 1 Pool? 
I believe that the Seventh Circuit will overturn 
Judge Zagel's view that "equality is equity." 
Judge Zagel's Second Conclusion 
of Law 
Judge Zagel also held that FCStone is subject to 
.. common law tracing due to the co-equal claims of 
the competing trust claimants. He then stated that 
FCStone failed to meet this tracing standard. In 
fact, he stated that such tracing was impossible. 
FCStone's expert did in fact identify the location 
of the SEG 1 Pool assets but this, according to the 
court, is indicative of why tracing is not possible 
in this case. He then stated: 
"But for tracing purposes, the critical 
shortcoming of Ms. McCloskey's report 
is that it fails to adequately account for 
the fact that none of Sentinel's customers 
(referring to the FCMs) held specific own-
ership interests in securities. Rather they 
own pro rata portions of investment port-
folios which Sentinel was free to fill with 
any of the securities in its pool of assets so 
long as those securities met the portfolio's 
investment criteria." 
Judge Zagel believed that the "fungible nature 
of cash alone makes it impossible to trace specific 
securities back to the original customer deposits 
in this case. "50 He then stated: 
"So, commingling aside, Sentinel's invest-
ment model makes tracing essentially im-
possible because, upon deposit, customer 
funds were immediately converted into 
an abstract ownership interest. In other 
words. Sentinel's pooled investment mod-
el renders tracing impracticable because 
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there is no specific form of converted trust prop-
erty to trace. " 51 
In support of FCStone's position and that of the 
CFTC, the critical case to analyze is Begierv. l.R.S.52 
Begier holds, in essence, that trust assets should 
not be deemed property of the bankrupt estate 
and that tracing is not required if a nexus can 
be shown between the assets received by the 
beneficiary and those held in trust by the debt-
or. In its Amicus Brief in Sentinel II in the Seventh 
Circuit case, the CFTC stated: 
"The nexus approach requires that the fed-
eral trust claimant must establish 'some 
connection' between the original trust as-
sets defined by the relevant statute and 
the 'assets sought to be applied' to the 
trust claim subsequently in circumstances 
where the original trust assets have been 
commingled or transferred (citing Begier, 
496 U.S. at 65-66). The court has flexibility in 
determining what connection is sufficient 
in particular circumstances so long as it 
'applies reasonable assumptions to govern 
the tracing of funds .. .' These reasonable 
assumptions can include, but are not re-
stricted to, common law tracing.''53 
Judge Zagel held that, since the FCMs deposit-
ed cash with Sentinel, such cash is intangible and 
cannot be traced.54 The SEC in its Amicus Brief 
concurred with Judge Zagel and distinguished 
Begier by stating that Begier is inapplicable as Be-
gier did not involve competing claims by benefi-
ciaries of two trusts, as applies here.55 
I also believe that the Seventh Circuit will dis-
agree with Judge Zagel's analysis on this point 
as well. The CEA requires all FCMs to "treat 
and deal with all money, securities and prop-
erty received ... to margin, guarantee, or secure 
the trades or contracts of any customer of such 
person, or accruing to such customer ... "56• The 
term "money" clearly refers to cash. Section 
4d(b) further requires that depositories of com-
modity customer funds not "hold, dispose of, or 
use any such assets as belonging to the deposit-
ing futures commission merchant or any person 
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other thq_n the customers of such futures com-
mission merchant. "57 
While Sentinel was registered as an FCM, it is 
also acting as a depository for FCStone and the 
other FCMs that invested their customer assets 
through Sentinel. At all times, the customer as-
sets must be held in segregation and be treated 
as belonging to futures customers. No such law 
or rule applies to investment advisers. The fact 
that Sentinel improperly commingled the SEG 1 
Pool assets with the SEG 3 Pool assets does not 
remove this statutory trust feature from the FCM 
customer funds. Regardless of the location of the 
customer assets of FCStone, this statutory trust 
continues to apply. In essence, a floating trust ap-
plies, and continues to apply, to these customer 
assets at all times once the customer assets are 
deposited in a customer segregated account. That 
was the clear Congressional intent. 
Moreover, Judge Zagel does not understand 
how customer segregation works in the futures 
industry. An FCM opens a Customer Segre-
gated Account at a custodian bank. Its custom-
ers directly transfer their "cash, securities and 
property" into the FCM's Customer Segregated 
Account at the custodian bank, a commingled 
omnibus-type account. The mere commingling 
of customer assets in these customer segregated 
accounts, which is clearly permitted by the CEA 
and applicable CFTC regulations, does not de-
stroy the statutory trust. 
The FCM may never hold such funds held in 
these customer segregated accounts as belong-
ing to the FCM. The FCM, as a clearing member 
firm, also acts as an agent on behalf of its custom-
ers and will transfer such customer cash, securi-
ties or property to the clearing house if any initial 
or variation margin is required to be transferred. 
The assets held at the clearing house are also 
maintained in a different commingled customer 
segregated account. In other words, the custom-
er's property is always required to be maintained 
in segregation. IAs, on the other hand, can receive 
customer property and then transfer it into one 
of three custodial accounts-at a broker-dealer 
(e.g., the most typical way), to another FCM (if it 
involves futures) or to a custodian bank. Sentinel 
chose the latter. Had it chosen either of the first 
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two apgroaches, the customer funds held in the 
SEG 3 Pool would have been protected. 
Also, many futures customers give cash to their 
FCM to meet their initial margin obligations. 
The FCM must account for and report various 
financial information to the customer, including 
the customer's total amount of cash, securities 
or property held by the FCM on its behalf. This 
accounting clearly satisfies the tracing element. 
FCStone's experts proved that. They were able 
to trace every dollar received by Sentinel from 
each FCM for investment in the SEG 1 Pool. 
The fact that cash is intangible should not con-
trol this analysis. In fact, when cash is received 
by an FCM, CFTC Rule 1.25 clearly permits 
an FCM to invest customer assets provided that 
any such investments comply with the permis-
sible restricted investments. Therefore, an FCM 
can take customer cash, which is fungible, invest 
such cash in U.S. government securities, which 
is what FCStone did through Sentinel. However, 
the government securities that are purchased by 
the FCM with the customer's cash belongs to and 
are held at all times for the benefit of the cus-
tomers. Such government securities must be held 
in a Customer Segregated Account at all times. 
Regardless of their location, these government 
securities are deemed to be "customer property", 
that is, funds belonging to the FCM's customers 
whether the underlying assets are held in cash 
or government securities purchased by the FCM 
with such cash. All customer "monies, securities 
and property" held in these customer segregated 
accounts are held by the FCM as "belonging to 
the customer. "58 
Therefore, the common law tracing require-
ment imposed by Judge Zagel simply should not 
apply here. All such assets at all times belong to 
and for the benefit of the customers of that FCM 
regardless of what form the assets now take or 
their location. The applicable CFTC regulations 
require that there is a proper amount of funds 
held in the Customer Segregated Account re-
gardless of their form. Thus, if an FCM invests 
$100,000 of cash received from ABC, a futures 
customer, into a $100,000 Treasury bill, ABC's 
name need not be placed on that T-Bill. The T-
Bill purchased with such cash is held in the Cus-
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tomer Segregration Account of the FCM just 
like the cash would be. An FCM invests not just 
ABC's cash but the cash of all customers held 
in the omnibus Customer Segregated Account 
when making such permissible investments 
under CFTC Rule 1.25. The key is not wheth-
er ABC's $100,000 in cash can be identified 
through any specific investment but that ABC's 
assets are protected, whether they be in same or 
like kind. In fact, CFTC Rule 190.10 specifically 
states that U.S. Treasury bills are not deemed to 
be "specially identifiable property" but are to be 
treated as cash.59 The fact that Ms. McCloskey 
could follow the movement of the exact amount 
that should have been held in Sentinel's Custom-
er Segregated Account should satisfy any tracing 
requirement.60 
Judge Zagel's Third Conclusion 
of Law 
Judge Zagel held that the transfer of assets to 
the Customer Segregated Accounts of FCStone 
(and all of the other FCMs) was not authorized 
by the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy 
Court. As noted above, the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois au-
thorized this distribution on August 20, 2007.61 
Judge Zagel stated that the Bankruptcy Court did 
issue an Order stating that the assets, less a $15.6 
million holdback, could be distributed to the Cus-
tomer Segregated Accounts of the various FCMs. 
Judge Zagel then stated that the Order said noth-
ing about whether the proceeds were property 
of the estate. Approximately, one year later, on 
August 8, 2008, the Trustee for Sentinel filed a 
Motion to Clarify or in the Alternative to Vacate 
or Modify the Court's August 20, 2007 Order. In 
open court, the judge then explained that the Au-
gust 20, 2007 Order had not ruled on the "prop-
erty of the estate" issue. 
From a practical perspective, the funds distrib-
uted to FCStone's customers in August 2007 be-
longed to its customers who were free to remove 
those funds from FCStone. This distribution was 
clear and should be enforced. To hold otherwise 
will greatly jeopardize the U.S. futures markets as 
how will any FCM know whether the FCM may 
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later be held liable for funds distributed to a third 
party, namely its customers, five years earlier? 
FCStone, and all of the other FCMs, must be per-
mitted to rely on a Court Order as they did back 
in August 2007. In fact, several of the FCMs then 
queried other regulators to inquire whether these 
funds could ever be claw-backed; the regulators 
said "no." If they knew that they could be claw 
backed five years later, these funds might have 
been held in trust pending a further outcome. 
To hold as Judge Zagel did implies that an 
FCM is liable for the acts of any depository that 
it selects to hold customer assets. Sentinel was a 
depository that was registered as an FCM. There 
has never been any CFTC pronouncement that 
an FCM is liable under these circumstances. 62 In 
fact, it was just recently that the CFTC has raised 
this issue and has asked for comments whether an 
FCM should be held to be so liable.63 This regula-
tion or even an advisory has never been publicly 
pronounced by the CFTC. 
Finally, Judge Zagel focused on one word in the 
Authorization Order; that is, that the custodian 
bank "may" immediately distribute the Proceeds 
to Debtor's clients. Judge Zagel then stated that 
the Authorization Order reserved some rights. 
However, these rights appear to involve the right 
of the Trustee to seek legal action with respect to 
the "holdback"64 (e.g., the amount held back pur-
suant to the Bankruptcy Court's Order) and any 
actions regarding claims for priority under Sec-
tion 761-767.65 
One year later, the Bankruptcy Court issued 
an Order clarifying that it never ruled that the 
Citadel proceeds distributed were or were not 
property of the bankrupt estate. Query, should 
this Order issued one year later, which Judge Za-
gel relied upon, override the authorization test. 
If any transfer of property, including property of 
the bankrupt estate, had been authorized, it can-
not be claw backed.66 
Judge Zagel's ruling could have serious impact 
on future FCM bankruptcies. It raises questions 
about the ability of an FCM to accept customer 
assets from a failed FCM not knowing whether 
such customer assets may be clawed back in the 
future. Moreover, FCMs are not currently re-
quired to be held liable by the acts of another 
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FCM or a depository regarding customer funds 
that it has given to such entities.67 
INITIAL TRANSFEREE ISSUE IN 
SENTINEL/I 
Another critical issue arising from Sentinel II is 
whether FCStone was an "initial transferee" or 
not. In other words, was the distribution made to 
FCStone's Customer Segregated Account for the 
benefit of FCStone or not. Judge Zagel concluded 
that it was.68 This finding was critical or the post-
petition distributions made on August 20, 2007 
to the Customer Segregated Accounts of the vari-
ous FCMs could not be voided. 
Interestingly, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does 
not define the term "initial transferee." The vari-
ous circuits have applied different theories to de-
fine this term. The Seventh Circuit has applied 
a "dominion and control" test to determine the 
initial transferee test.69 To meet this test, the party 
must have dominion over the money or other as-
sets and the right to put the money to one's own 
purpose.70 I believe that the Seventh Circuit will 
also decide against Judge Zagel on this issue. 
FCMs merely act as a conduit over their futures 
customer assets. As noted above, all futures cus-
tomer assets are held in a customer segregated ac-
count, and all "monies, securities and property" 
held in these segregated accounts constitute "cus-
tomer property" belonging to the customers of 
the FCM. The FCM merely acts as a trustee over 
such funds, transferring the underlying assets ei-
ther to a clearing house or back to the customer, 
as the case may be. True, an FCM may invest such 
customer property, pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.25 
as noted above, but all such investments, and any 
interest earned on such investments, constitute 
"customer property" while held in the customer 
segratated account. Under such circumstances, 
they do not belong to the FCM until such inter-
est is distributed from the customer segratated ac-
count to the FCM. 
Judge Zagel acknowledged that this is a case of 
first impression on this issue relating to an FCM. 
All prior cases involve the liquidation of a stock 
brokerage firm which clearly have the right to use 
customer assets on behalf of the broker-dealer. In 
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deciding this issue, Judge Zagel focused on t~e 
fact that FCMs deposit their own capital, nor-
mally referred to as "residual interest", into their 
Customer Segregated Accounts. FCMs make such 
capital investment in order to ensure that the as-
sets in these specially-protected accounts equal 
or exceed the required amount, and thus avoid a 
shortfall.71 Judge Zagel opined that since FCMs 
function "as a de facto guarantor for all of its cus-
tomer funds invested with Sentinel'', then it must 
be an initial transferee. 72 
This is where Judge Zagel's logic fails, in my 
opinion, and the Seventh Circuit will reverse his 
decision. As noted above, there has never been a 
pronouncement that an FCM acts as a guaran-
tor over assets that it may deposit with a deposi-
tory and that depository, for whatever reason, 
misappropriates such customer assets. The role 
of the residual interest merely provides a buffer 
to ensure against a shortfall. Once deposited, 
the residual interest constitutes "customer prop-
erty" in the customer segregated account. Until 
just recently, no FCM was even required to make 
a residual interest in its customer segregated ac-
count. 73 The mere fact that FCMs do deposit their 
own funds in their customer segregated accounts 
should not cause them to become an initial trans-
feree. FCMs merely hold their customer funds in 
trust and act a mere conduit with respect to them. 
The post-petition distributions were, in my opin-
ion, made solely for the benefit of the customers 
of the FCMs.74 
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN SENTINEL P5 
In a prior case involving Sentinel, Frederick 
Grede as the Liquidation Trustee, filed a case 
against Bank of New York Mellon ("BONY"), 
which acted as the custodian for Sentinel's repo 
and futures customer accounts. Grede sought 
$312 million from BONY claiming that BONY 
knew about Sentinel's fraudulent use of its cus-
tomer assets and thus BONY acted inequitably 
and unlawfully. On August 12, 2012, Judge 
Zagel ruled that BONY was not liable for the 
actions taken by Sentinel with respect to its 
fraudulent movement of assets from its customer 
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accounts to an account held in the name of Sen-
tinel on BONY's books. Judge Zagel found that 
Grede had "failed to prove that Sentinel made 
the Transfers with the actual intent to hinder, 
delay or defraud its creditors. "76 On Novem-
ber 30, 2012, without any explanation, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Zagel's decision 
in Sentinel I and held that this appeal remains 
under consideration by the panel.77 On August 
26, 2013, the Seventh Circuit overturned Judge 
Zagel's lower court decision regarding Grede's 
fraudulent transfer and equitable subordination 
claims and remanded the case back to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings. 
In its decision in Sentinel I, the Seventh Cir-
cuit disagreed with Judge Zagel's analysis of sev-
eral of the facts and thus his conclusion of the 
law. For example, the Seventh Circuit disagreed 
.. with Judge Zagel's conclusion that the transfer 
of such funds to purchase the repos in Sentinel's 
name at BONY "was not enough to show that 
Sentinel had the actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud its FCM clients."78 The Seventh Circuit 
then stated that Sentinel's pledge of the segre-
gated funds "was driven by a desire to stay in 
business correctly identified the motive. "79 The 
Seventh Circuit then concluded that such moti-
vation did constitute the "actual intent" and thus 
constituted a fraudulent transfer.80 The Seventh 
Circuit further believed that Sentinel did in fact 
expose "its FCM clients to a substantial risk of 
loss of which they were unaware when it pledged 
funds that were supposed to remain segregated 
for the FCM clients. "81 
The Seventh Circuit then states: 
"Sentinel's pledge of the segregated funds 
as collateral for its own loans becomes 
particularly egregious when viewed in 
light of the legal requirements imposed 
on Sentinel by the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CEA). Again, even if we assume that 
Sentinel eventually intended to replace 
the segregated funds and earn greater re-
turns for their FCM clients, Sentinel knew 
that its pledge of the segregated funds 
violated the CEA. The CEA exists explicitly 
for the purpose of "ensur(ing) the finan-
cial integrity of all transactions" involv-
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ing FCMs, "avoid(ing systemic risk", and 
"protect(ing) all market participants from 
... misuses of customer assets." 7 U.S.C. 
§ S(b). In order to further these aims, the 
CEA requires that the "money, securities, 
and property (belonging to clients) shall 
be separately accounted for and shall not 
be commingled with the funds of such 
commission merchant." 7 U.S.C. § G(d)(a) 
(2). Moreover, 7 U.S.C. § G(d)(b) makes it 
"unlawful; for an FCM "to hold, dispose of, 
or use any such money, securities, or prop-
erty as belonging to the depositing futures 
commission merchant."82 
One possible consequence if the lower court, on 
remand, rules that BONY must equitably subor-
dinate its secured claim to unsecured claim status 
and the Seventh Circuit in Sentinel II affirms the 
claw back, then it is quite possible that a large 
amount of the Sentinel estate could be redistrib-
uted back to BONY. Query, is this something that 
the regulators and the courts have contemplated? 
The Seventh Circuit has previously ruled that 
the CFTC has "exclusive jurisdiction" over the 
futures markets in cases brought by the SEC83 
and in favor of FCM's actions regarding the con-
sequences of a customer's default in not making 
the required margin payments.84 In light of the 
recent FCM bankruptcies involving MF Global 
and Peregrine Financial Group, and given the lan-
guage noted above in the Seventh Circuit's opin-
ion in Sentinel I, I believe that the Seventh Circuit 
will reverse Judge Zagel's decision in Sentinel II. 
Nowhere in its opinion does the Seventh Circuit 
mention the SEG 3 Pool in Sentinel I. Its decision 
focused solely on the protections afforded futures 
customers under the CEA. 
IMPACT OF MADOFF CASE BEFORE 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
In In Re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Se-
curities, LLC,85 the Second Circuit must decide 
whether the SIPA Trustee appointed to handle the 
Madoff broker-dealer bankruptcy may or may 
not claw back any assets distributed to Madoff 
customers regarding assets acquired in the Ponzi 
scheme. Although this claw back issue is not di-
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reedy related to the claw back issue in Sentinel II, 
the legal issues are, that is, how Section 546(e) of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted. 
The Madoff case also involves competing inter-
ests, that is, what should the legislative policies 
be when the policies of the securities laws collide 
with the policies of the bankruptcy laws. Query, 
it would have been a more interesting case if Sen-
tinel had, in fact, deposited its SEG 3 Pool assets 
with a broker-dealer instead of with the Bank of 
New York Mellon, and the assets of the SEG 1 
and SEG3 Pools would have been commingled. 
The issue in Madoff is whether the safe harbor 
provisions in Section 546(e) should or should 
not apply. The Second Circuit must weigh the 
impact as to whether Madoff did not actually 
buy the underlying securities versus whether the 
SIPA Trustee does not have the right to claw back 
withdrawals by securities investors from their se-
curities accounts many years before because, un-
beknownst to these customers, Madoff was op-
erating a Ponzi scheme. Does this sound similar? 
Did the FCM Defendants know that Sentinel was 
commingling the SEG 1 Pool assets with the SEG 
3 Pool assets? 
Section 546(e) involves "transactions involving 
financial markets."86 And Section 546(e) contin-
ues to be amended "to expand its scope to accom-
modate and protect evolving markets. " 87 In its 
Arnie us Brief, SIFMA adds: " ... while Madoff's 
fraud was extraordinary, the agreements between 
Madoff and its investors were commonplace. "88 It 
will be interesting to see how the Seventh Circuit 
in Sentinel II and the Second Circuit in Madoff 
will decide these two cases of first impression. 
Section 546(e) was also cited by Judge Zagel 
regarding a second distribution to FCStone in 
the amount of $1,097,925 on August 17, 2007.89 
FCStone argued that this transfer was made in 
connection with a securuites contract and thus 
protected by the safe harbor provisions of Sec-
tion 546(e) whereas the Trustee argued that the 
transfer did not fall within the securities contract 
requirements. Judge Zagel declined to rule on this 
issue as he did not believe that Congress intended 
to apply the safe harbor provisions of 546(e) to 
this case.90 
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CONCLUSION 
FCStone has appealed Judge Zagel's ruling. It 
will be interesting to see how the Seventh Circuit 
might rule in Sentinel II. The oral arguments 
were held in the Seventh Circuit on December 
10, 2013. The Seventh Circuit, more than any 
other circuit, has a great understanding of the 
futures markets and has often issued decisions 
based on the economic impact of a lower court's 
decision. In my opinion, I believe that the Sev-
enth Circuit will reverse Judge Zagel's lower 
court decision in Sentinel II and order a retrial. 
To rule otherwise means that the Seventh Cir-
cuit would allow the claw back to occur, some 
six years after the customer funds were distrib-
uted to the FCStone's Customer Segregated Ac-
count, which will have a devastating effect on 
FCMs and the futures industry. 
The CFTC and the exchanges, in the event of 
an FCM's bankruptcy, reach out to other FCMs 
to accept the non-defaulting customers of the 
failed FCM. If a claw back is later permitted, why 
should FCMs work with the CFTC and the ex-
changes in such circumstances. The CEA provi-
sions and specific CFTC regulations dealing with 
protecting customer assets should, in this author's 
opinion, trump the SEC regulation on the IA Cus-
tody Rule. It's unfortunate that the customer as-
sets held in the SEG 3 Pool might not be treated 
equitably, but Sections 4d of the CEA and CFTC 
Regulations 1.20 through 1.29, which are quite 
detailed in nature, should be the rule of law in 
this case. 
© Ronald H. Filler 
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